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Abstract
We present a mechanism that puts users in the cen-
ter of control and empowers them to dictate the ac-
cess to their collections of data. Revisiting the fun-
damental mechanisms in security for providing pro-
tection, our solution uses capabilities, access lists,
and access rights following well-understood formal
notions for reasoning about access. This contribu-
tion presents a practical, correct, auditable, trans-
parent, distributed, and decentralized mechanism
that is well-matched to the current emerging envi-
ronments including Internet of Things, smart city,
precision medicine, and autonomous cars. It is
based on well-tested principles and practices used
in distributed authorization, cryptocurrencies, and
scalable computing.
1 Introduction
In not too long a fully deployed Internet of Things
(IoT), smart city, precision medicine, and au-
tonomous cars will become a reality, with it comes
huge promises for the reduction of frictions and rise
of efficiencies. This promise relies on analysis of
massive amount of data, often times refereed to as
big data analytics. However, gaining access to this
massive amount of data, at a scale required by these
environments, while preserving user’s right is prov-
ing difficult. Data is stored in a variety of locations,
managed by different service providers, to be an-
alyzed by diverse entities, and subject to range of
regulations concerning public records and individ-
ual privacy.
In order to make the dream of these emerging
environments a reality, it is crucial to address the
aforementioned challenges with more flexible and
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scalable data sharing models. Here, we present our
solution, a user-centric data dissemination and dis-
tribution system to enable scalable data sharing and
solving the following problems:
1. User-centric. data collected from the data
sources potentially represents the activities of mil-
lions of users (individuals or organizations) and
their possessions. Commonly, in these environments
users themselves do not know what private data has
been stored, who manages it, or where it resides.
Arguably, this user factor should be informed and
the ultimate deciding factor in control of their data.
2. Privacy-preserving. many users are willing to
grant access to their data as long as their privacy is
preserved. The goal here is to not allow data analyz-
ers infer the identity of data owner through protocol
mechanisms. The only way that an adversary can
learn the identity of data owner would be through
analysis of data content which is out of this work’s
scope.
3. Endorsed. naturally, trusted third parties
should contribute in helping ascertain the trustwor-
thiness of a party. But this role should be advisory,
whereas now they are actively making these deci-
sions on behalf of data owners.
4. Accessible. to take full advantage of data
and produce actionable insight, data will need to be
available for analysis to a diverse group of external
sources such as researchers, social entrepreneurs,
city departments, healthcare providers, and private
sector. Also, any user such as data owners and data
analyzers should be able to easily join the system.
5. Scalable. as the emerging environments scale
to billions of data sources and millions of users,
granting control to users becomes a very challenging
problem. At this scale, conventional best practices
are not practical, it becomes impossible to main-
tain an access control list on each single sensor, or
near impossible to rely on centralized access control
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server, or agreed upon trusted parties based proto-
cols. Networks of billions of devices and millions of
users would require maintaining enormous accessi-
ble access control lists that if possible at all would
be very expensive and challenging with their strict
availability and consistency needs.
6. De-centralized. current environments, less
and less frequently have centralized control, and are
typically managed by a very diverse group of service
providers. Because of these heterogeneous and dis-
parate environments, it is often difficult to manage
the issues of trust relationship management, data
management, regulatory compliance and data shar-
ing in a centralized control system. Server-client
models such as Kerberos [5] can not be used in such
environments due to lack of central point of trust.
7. Distributed. data resides on the clouds and at
the edge on billions of data sources. As the emerg-
ing environments grow and data generating devices
deployed at ever increasing rates, we find that data
remain siloed and inaccessible. Mainly due to the
fact that the generated data is owned by millions
of users and managed by a wide range of organiza-
tions.
8. Asynchronous. lack of connectivity is a tra-
ditional challenge in many environments. Devices
might not be nearly as well connected. A network
of sensors implemented in a house that is not nec-
essarily exposed to the whole world. This requires
systems to function without the need of persistent
connectivity.
9. Compliant. many countries proscribe specific
requirements and liabilities upon organizations that
hold or manage data. These entities are often sub-
ject to the regulatory requirements, e.g. HIPAA, Di-
rective 2011/24/EU, and other similar laws for en-
tities covered by healthcare privacy regulations.
10. Transparent. in the absence of a centralized
trusted party, transparency is a key principle to keep
parties honest. Enhancing transparency ensures that
legislation are adhered to in the emerging environ-
ments.
11. Auditable. users should be able to share their
data with any chosen data requester, as well as track
and monitor the requesters access. Audit is a critical
feature to track who, when, and where has access a
data.
12. Correct. showing security correctness is a
major requirement for practical applications in or-
der to prevent protocol and implementation flaws.
13. Usable. we need a system that can securely
provide the above functionalities for locating and
sharing data between data sources, and/or entities.
Distribution and privacy concerns make implemen-
tation of very basic Big Data Analytics primitives
nearly impossible. For instance, in the current
setting, ‘dataset lookup’, the simple task of finding
a data set is a major quest.
Our solution provides a mechanism for the user to
control at scale. Two differentiating contributions in
our solution are: first, separation of the data store
from the data management, and second, architect-
ing both components scalable, decentralized and
distributed. These two major contributions provide
substantial benefit to resolving aforementioned
challenges; it grants the possibility of keeping data
at its origin, overcomes the single point of trust and
failure, and adapts to the growth of users and data
sources.1
This paper describes and evaluates a practical
and correct implementation of this solution in a
system called Dusc. The paper contains an im-
proved version of the system, a full discussion of an
implementation, a proof of the system’s correctness,
and an evaluation of its practicality by performance
measurement, storage costs, query times, and
Blockchain consistency times. This version provides
substantial improvements including support for
local parallelization.
Dusc has three main components which uti-
lizes best practices in computer security and
distributed systems: data management protocol,
messaging service, and data store system. First,
a data management protocol in which different
roles can interact with each other in a secure and
private manner based on capability-based access
control. Second, a decentralized and distributed
data store system that allows each role able to
communicate with each other without the need
for a trusted third party based on Blockchain.
Although our solution has a different purpose,
recent cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin provide
an interesting and similar successful implemen-
tations of decentralized and secure circulation of
currency. Third, a scalable messaging service based
on publish-subscribe model designed to provide
flexible and reliable communication between many
senders and receivers without the need of persistent
connectivity. Our solution is fully decentralized and
distributed in order to accommodate the massive
1Preliminary version of this idea in the context of Internet
of Things has recently been proposed by the authors. The
manuscript will appear soon in an IoT conference. Due to the
“Anonymous submission” policy, paper is not referenced. Con-
tribution of the current paper compared to the IoT one is high-
lighted in the next paragraph.
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scale of the IoT, smart city, precision medicine, and
autonomous cars paradigms. Because the system is
user-centric, no trust of any participant is implied
and automatic. While still maintaining the ability to
scale, this provides full control of access control and
propagation, system security, and user privacy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we give an overview of our so-
lution. Sections 3, 4, and 5 will describe the three
components of our solution, data management pro-
tocol, data store system, and messaging service re-
spectively. We discus the implementation and evalu-
ation of our proposed solution in Section 6. Section
7 looks back at how Duschas addressed the afore-
mentioned challenges.
2 System Model and Design
Further, we explain the roles, primitives offered to
these roles, along with the scalability and threat as-
sumptions. For the rest of this paper we use Abadi
et. al notations [2],[3] to formally describe the sys-
tem and protocols. Notations are explained in Table
1.
2.1 Roles
Four main roles are introduced in our model:
• Data Owner: an individual or organization who
is in possession of data. This role does not nec-
essarily generate or store the data. In our model,
data owner grants the access to the data.
• Data Source: represents a computer system, indi-
vidual, or organization, who manages and stores
data objects, be it at rest or in motion. Examples
would include cloud providers, managers of Elec-
tronic Health Record (EHR) systems, application
gateways, and archival systems. A sensor can act
as data source if it has enough performance, con-
nectivity, and storage, otherwise its data is stored
elsewhere.
• Data Requester: an individual or organization
that requests access to other data owners’ data,
available within the network. Examples are re-
searcher, company, data aggregator, or another
device.
• Endorser: a third party individual or organiza-
tion that validates a request. This may be a
trusted authority, organization, or known individ-
ual. Endorser either provides supplementary in-
formation regarding credibility, or validates au-
thenticity of the role’s identity. Examples of en-
dorser are but not limited to: FDA, NIH, DMV, mu-
nicipal, Internal Review Board (IRB), and external
review by additional research institute (Hospital A
asks hospital B for review).
2.2 Primitives
Following primitives are considered for the above
roles in our model:
• Data Discovery: users have many data generat-
ing devices and more likely no substantial data
storage. They should know what data they own
or have the rights to. They should have one view
that allows them to see a portfolio of all of the
data they own.
• Data Request: the subject should be able to
search for a collection of data that meets their
conditions. The request should be easily con-
verted to a data access authorization.
• Audit: users should be able to share their data
with any chosen data requester, as well as track
and monitor the requester’s access.
2.3 Assumptions
Following scalability and threat assumptions are
considered in our model:
A1. We assume that data sources are aware of their
users’ identity (public key), i.e. data source S
knows its user’s public key KX , and can securely
authenticate signed messages by that user:
{message}X ′ =⇒ X says message
A2. We assume that during user registration, users
are provided with a mechanism to authenticate
the identity of the data source. This mechanism
can be verification from a certificate authority
or a token:
{KC}X =⇒ C
A3. We assume that the endorsers’ identity can be
relied upon as valid via currently available tech-
nologies such as PKI, i.e. if a subject trusts a
3
Table 1: Notations used in this paper adopted from
Abadi et. al [2],[3]
Notation Description
{M}X Encrypted message M using X ’s pub-lic key.
{M}X ′ Signed message M using X ’s privatekey.
X Identity of X .
KX X ’s public key.
Oi Data Owner i.
Si Data Source i.
Ri Data Requester i.
Ei Endowser i.
DOT Data Object Ticket.
DAP Data Access Path.
RT Request Ticket.
DAT Data Access Ticket (Capability)
X says Y X makes the statement Y .
X for Y Y on behalf of X .
X controls Y
X is trusted on Y : if X says Y then Y .
This is the meaning of X appearing
in the ACL for Y . [2]
certificate authority such as C which signs an
endorser identity E, then:
KC =⇒ C
KC says (KE =⇒ E)→ KE =⇒ E
A4. We address the issue of traffic analysis in this
paper; however we make a best effort attempt
rather than attempting to completely obfuscate
users’ access patterns.
A5. It is assumed that users may trust their local
computing environment. We understand that
this assumption is difficult to guarantee and the
execution of sensitive programs in untrusted
environments will continue to be a risk.
A6. We assume that attackers have a specific set of
abilities. We assume that attackers can view
system’s data, are able to present modified data
to participants, and may impersonate roles. We
also assume that attackers do not have access
to private keys, and cannot gain local adminis-
trator access to the systems.
A7. We assume the security of the Blockchain sys-
tem, and cryptographic integrity of the utilized
encryption protocols.
Figure 1: Our solution consists of three main com-
ponents: i. data management protocol, ii. data
store system, and iii. messaging service. Data man-
agement protocol is a secure capability-based sys-
tem. The messaging service is based on publish-
subscribe architecture. Data store system is based
on the Blockchain.
A8. We assume that ‘things’ either have the capabil-
ity to act as a data source or are able to transmit
their data to a data source securely.
A9. We assume that each data object has at least
one data owner.
A10. We do not address DoS attacks in the current
system. In the future works, this attack can be
addressed by the best efforts and practices.
2.4 Our solution
Reviewed the roles, primitives, and assumptions in
our model, we introduce our solution for empower-
ing the users by controlling the access to their data
at scale. Our system consists of three main compo-
nents:
1. Data management protocol
2. Data store system
3. Messaging service
An overview of our system with the three com-
ponents is illustrated in Figure 1. Data manage-
ment protocol provides a framework for interaction
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among different roles with an access control mecha-
nism. The protocol is a secure capability-based sys-
tem. Data store system provides a persistent, dis-
tributed, and decentralized storage for the access
control component; it is based on Blockchain and
provides full transparency of transactions very simi-
lar to Bitcoin. The messaging service plays an impor-
tant role for the scalability of our solution; it is based
on publish-subscribe architecture and designed to
provide scalable, flexible, and reliable communica-
tion between many senders and receivers without
the need of persistent connectivity.
Our solution is user-oriented; users are the bridge
between different networks of data generating de-
vices, and they are ultimately authorizing the access
to their data. Information regarding the user’s pos-
sessions is sent to the user securely and privately.
This data is accessible whenever the user demands
to view it. Data owners are aware of the existence
of data by direct knowledge or control over the sen-
sor/actuator producing the data. Additionally, they
may learn about the existence of data via notifica-
tions generated by the data sources and transmitted
directly to the data owner, mainly to communicate
the management of data by the data source.
Data requests are broadcasted to all the data own-
ers within the system. Data owners are not required
to review all the requests. In case a data owner is
not interested in sharing any data, they can easily
filter out all the requests, or they can selectively fil-
ter out requests based on their interest. Also, user’s
trusted endorsers may verify a data request. This
helps protecting users against malicious or unethi-
cal data requests, as well as assisting them with risk
assessment of received data requests.
Data requests, upon arrival by the user, will be
checked against the user’s portfolio in the client. If
the conditions are met, and data owner is willing to
share the data, a capability ticket will be issued to
the data requester which provides necessary autho-
rization for accessing the requested data.
Whenever two roles want to interact, one sends a
message to the messaging service component. Then,
the elements of messaging service will send the mes-
sage to the data store system which is based on
Blockchain. After successful storage of the message
in the data store system, it will be fetched by the
recipient through the messaging service.
In the next sections, we explain these three com-
ponents in more detail.
3 Data Management Protocol
Data management protocol provides a framework
for different roles to interact in a secure and private
manner. The protocol is a decentralized capability-
based access control. The communication between
different roles is performed by message passing.
Each message contains a sender, a receiver, and a
payload. Messages are delivered through the under-
lying “Messaging Service” which is described later in
Section 5.
In this section, first, we compare our data man-
agement protocol to capability-based access control
systems. Later, we introduce data structures used
in the message payloads along with the messages
transmitted in the protocol. Throughout this sec-
tion, we use notions described in Table 1.
3.1 Capability-Based Access Control
Our system is implementing a distributed and de-
centralized capability based access control system.
Capability is a token that gives a data requester per-
mission to access a data owner’s data object on a
data source. Using capability based access control,
our system avoids the necessity of having a central-
ized trusted party to confer trust. Instead, the data
owners are responsible for issuing the capability to
other users.
In our implementation, capabilities are issued by
the data owners (O). Each one indicates who is the
issuer, to which data requester (R) this capability
is issued, and the object to grant access to. Addi-
tionally, each capability contains the access rights in
the form of data queries, it also contains information
about where and how the data can be accessed. Ca-
pabilities are not transferable or usable by any sub-
ject other than the intended data requester. As the
result, the data owner will remain the sole controller
of the data:
(R for O) says d
Our capability is implemented as a data structure
that contains:
• Access rights: every capability issued contains
a query that adds additional restrictions on the
data access.
• Identities: are used to uniquely describe capa-
bility issuer and issue. Due to the decentralized
nature of the system, it is not an easy task to
identify every subject. Therefore, public keys
are used to identify subjects in the capability.
Based on implementations such as RSA, or PKI,
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it is assumed that generated key pairs are al-
ways unique. There is a many-to-one relation-
ship between capabilities and a public key. Mul-
tiple entities can share a public/private key pair
in order to implement a joint ownership.
KX ⇒ X
In our implementation of capability, following op-
erations are contained:
• Create: right to create capabilities is restricted to
the data owners (O). As soon as the data object
(d) is generated and stored on a data source (S),
this right is delegated to data owners in order to
grant access to potential data requesters (R). This
creation of right is not transferable.
∀R,O controls [(R for O) says d]
• Delegate: deleting a capability is not possible for
the sake of audition and non-repudiation. How-
ever, a data object referred by the capability can
be revoked by moving (or removing) the data on
the data source.
Audit is a critical feature to track who, when, and
where has access a data. In the absence of a central-
ized trusted party, our implementation provides the
audit feature through the capability call back key.
Data sources will inform the data owners when ca-
pabilities are used to access data objects.
Also, the capability is stored by the data requester.
Upon arrival, capability can be verified without an
external access control list. As a result, having more
capabilities or data objects may not require extra
storage and computing power on the data storage,
nor the data owner.
3.2 Protocol Data Structures
Five data structures are used in the payload of mes-
sages. Data Objects are data at rest or data in motion
stored in the data sources. Even though the data
objects are not directly used and transmitted in the
message, the ultimate goal is to manage their ac-
cess. Data objects could be files or records within
a file repository, database, cloud provider, or any
other data storage system. In practice, there are
no limiting factors that would prevent our system
from supporting other documents such as paper doc-
uments, film, recordings or another non-digitized
media. Data Objects in motion could be a variety of
live data sources, including but not limited to: sen-
sors, video streams, audio streams, health trackers,
location data, etc. Lastly, a Data Object may repre-
sent an actuator or device that the data requester
may interact with. An example may be a Physical
Access Control Systems (door locks, and alarm sys-
tems), a PTZ camera, a traffic light, a shared vehicle
ignition system, etc.
Five data structures used in the payload of mes-
sages transmitted in the Data Management Protocol
are:
1. Data Object Ticket (DOT): the right to issue
a capability to access a data object. This ticket
is issued by the data source and contains the
unique id of specified data object, the iden-
tity of the owner (KO), the identity of the data
source (KS), data access path (DAP), and meta-
data describing attributes of data object, signed
by the data source:
DOT = {Data ID,KO,metadata,DAP}K′S ,KS
2. Data Access Path (DAP): this message repre-
sents a mechanism for an authorized role to
gain access to the data object. Some examples
of this DAP can be:
• URL/URI (FTP/SFTP/SCP/HTTP/HTTPS)
• Record Locator
• Contact Information
• Instructions
• Physical Location
Note: In our implementation, tickets can be
utilized as the authentication mechanism for
TLS/SFTP/SSH as they are generated from the
TLS standard.
3. Request Tickets (RT): these are messages
broadcasted by the data requester to all the sub-
scribers. A data request ticket typically consists
of a data query, participation conditions, dura-
tion of access, and some relevant metadata:
RT= {Request ID,KO,Query,Conditions,Duration,
Metadata,KR}K′R
A data query indicates to the data owner what
data the data requester intends to collect from
data owners. The query format is determined
by data sources. Participation conditions are
constraints on data owner in order to determine
if they are qualified to participate in the data re-
quest. For example in a medical data collection
this condition can be on:
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• Nationality of Participant
• Demographic information about partici-
pant, age, gender, or residency
• Relationships with certain data source
providers, i.e. only data stored with
Google or Apple
4. Endorsements: provide a method for an en-
dorser or endorsers to provide additional third
party information to the data request. This in-
formation will help the data owners to decide
whether they are willing to share data for a re-
quest. For example, endorsement can be:
• Metadata regarding the data privacy pol-
icy of the data requester
• Results of a third party audit or attes-
tation regarding the information security
controls in place at the organization
• Results of an Internal Review Board (IRB)
decision
• Authorization by a government entity to
conduct a trial or research (FAA, NIH,
HHS)
• Indication that data will be shared in a
joint collaboration
• Verification of the data requester authen-
ticity by a service provider or other trusted
third party (Think CA/Trusted Roots in
PKI)
Endorsement is done by chain of signatures.
For example the following request ticket is en-
dorsed by two endorser E1 and E2:
{{RT,KR,FeedbackE1}K′E1 ,E1,FeedbackE2}K′E2
5. Data Access Ticket (DAT): is a capability that
gives authorization to access a data object. The
ticket is issued by the data owner to grant
the specified data requester access to the data
source and contains the identity of the entity
who will access the data. But it is not sent di-
rectly to the data source. Additionally it con-
tains an identity to receive the acknowledgment
when the ticket is being used.
DAT= {KO,DOT,{Data ID,Query,
KO,K3O,KR}K′O}KS
In order to protect the real identity of data own-
ers, a data owner may choose to use multiple
identities during the ticket exchange process:
Figure 2: Data Management Protocol with five class
of messages transmitted among four roles. Numbers
on connections correspond to the message types.
• KO is the identity that is shared with the data
source
• K2O is the identity to be used to communicate
with the data requester. This identity is not
known by the data source
• K3O is the identity to receive the acknowledg-
ment of ticket being used. This identity is not
known by the data requester
3.3 Authorization Messages in the Pro-
tocol
In this section, we describe the messages transmit-
ted in the protocol. These five class of messages are
illustrated in Figure 2 and a summary is provided in
Figure 3. Messages contained in the protocol are:
• Message 1: Data Source Ticket Generation The
goal of this message is to let the data owner (O)
know about the existence of a new data object
which belongs to the recipient. Furthermore, the
included data object ticket allows for the owner to
delegate discretionary access to the data object.
The other included token {KS}K′O (from A1 as-
sumption) authenticates the data source to the
data owner. Later, DOT can be used to authen-
ticate the recipient.
• Message 2: Data Request The data requester
broadcasts a data request to the system sub-
scribers. This data request may contain endorse-
ments from one or more endorsers which may
provide supplementary information regarding the
data request.
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(M1) S→ O : {DOT{KS}K′O}KO
DOT= {Data ID,KO,metadata,DAP}K′S
(M2) R→∗ : {[{Hash{RT}, Feedback}K′E1 ]
+,
RT,KE1,KR}K′R ,KR
RT= {Request ID,Query,Conditions,
Metadata,Duration,KR}K′R
(M3) O via K2O→ R : [{Data ID,DAP,DAT,KS}KR ]+
{Request ID,K2O,{Checksum}K2′O }K2′O ,
DAT= {KO,DOT,{Data ID, Request ID,
Query,KO,K3O,KR}K′O}KS
(M4) R→ S : [DAT]+,
{{Hash{[DAT]+}}K′RKR}KS
(M5) S→ O : {KS,DOT,
{Query,KO,K3O,KR}K′O}K3O
Figure 3: Five access control messages in the Data
Management Protocol.
The data owner’s client will process the data re-
quests against its library of data object tickets in
order to check if participation condition is met,
and identify which tickets may meet the specifica-
tions of the data query.
Endorsements as well as supplementary infor-
mation can also help the data owner to decide
on whether to participate in the data request.
Data owner can verify originate of endorsement
by checking endorser’s identities (from A3 as-
sumption) as well as confirming the KR in RT is
matched with the sender of request.
• Message 3: Ticket Exchange When the data
owner consents to grant access to the data ob-
ject(s), a ticket exchange message is sent to the
data requester. This ticket contains one or more
data access tickets per data source, each one con-
taining part of requested data. Each data ac-
cess ticket includes identity KS of the data source
which is storing the data object, as well as the ad-
dress that the data can be accessed by (DAP).
• Message 4: Data Access As as a result of the mes-
sage 3, the data requester has now received the
data access path as well as any other relevant in-
formation needed to access the data. Depending
on the application, the data requester may contact
the data source(s) directly or indirectly through
the system.
Data source can verify the access by testing:
1. DOT is signed by the data source S and in-
cludes KO. This will verify O right to grant a
capability on Data ID:
DOT ⇒ O controls Data ID
2. DAT includes signed Data ID, Query, and KR
with KO which matched with requester key.
This verifies O grant a capability on Data ID
using Query for R:
{KR, Data ID , Query}K′O ⇒
O says (KR∧ Data ID ∧ Query)
(R for O) says DataID∧Query
3. Optionally, the data source can check Request
ID against a data request black list.
• Message 5: Access Announcement In step 5, it is
expected that Data Sources will announce to the
system that access has been made utilizing the
DAP(s) and credentials provided in Step 3 and
accessed as part of Step 4. This allows the data
owner to monitor accesses to their data and in-
form other parties about successful transmission
of transaction.
4 Data Store System
In this section we explain the design of the access
control data store system. This storage system sup-
ports the distributed access control and is separated
from the source data. Separation of source data
grants the possibility of keeping source data at its
origin. The access control data store component is a
persistent, scalable, decentralized, and distributed
storage system based on Blockchain. We model
the Blockchain as a form of persistent data storage
with update notification support. It overcomes the
single point of trust and failure, and provides full
transparency of transactions very similar to Bitcoin.
It has to be noted that the Bitcoin’s Blockchain is
just an example of an appropriate protocol, possibly,
there exists other such appropriate protocols. Be-
fore explaining the system, it is necessary to review
core components of the system which are adopted
from the Bitcoin’s Blockchain. Then we show how
Blockchain can be used as data storage:
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4.1 Blockchain
Bitcoin, the system first introduced by Nakamoto
[4], is the first truly decentralized global currency
system. Like any other currency, its main purpose is
to facilitate the exchange of goods and services by
offering a commonly accepted value. Unlike tradi-
tional currencies however, Bitcoin does not rely on
a centralized authority to issue, control the supply,
distribution and verification of the validity of trans-
actions. Bitcoin enables a network of computers to
maintain a collective bookkeeping via the internet.
This bookkeeping is neither closed nor in control of
one party. Rather, it is public and available in one
digital ledger called Blockchain which is fully dis-
tributed across the network and relies on a network
of volunteers that collectively implement a repli-
cated ledger and verify transactions. Traditionally,
Blockchain has been discussed in the context of Bit-
coin, however Blockchain goes beyond the scope of
consensus currency, introduces many new and inno-
vative methods for propagating information in the
network, public transaction history, multi granular-
ity and many others.
Blockchain uses a multi-hop broadcast to propa-
gate transactions and blocks through the network
to update the ledger replicas. In the Blockchain, all
transactions are logged including information on the
date, time, participants and amount of every single
transaction. Each node in the network owns a full
copy of the Blockchain and on the basis of cryp-
tographic principles, the transactions are verified
by the so-called Bitcoin Miners, who maintain the
ledger. The systematic eventual consistency princi-
ples also ensure that these nodes automatically and
continuously agree about the current state of the
ledger and every transaction in it. If anyone at-
tempts to corrupt a transaction, the nodes will not
arrive at a consensus and hence will refuse to incor-
porate the transaction in the Blockchain. So every
transaction is public and thousands of nodes unani-
mously agree that a transaction has occurred on par-
ticular date and time. In Blockchain, trust comes
from the fact that everyone has access to a shared
single source of truth. The decentralized property is
the fundamental difference from previous systems
which relied on a centralized block issuer and re-
quired users to trust the original issuer, which was
still used to eventually clear transactions.
In our solution, we use the Blockchain to store the
access control data in a decentralized manner. Prior
to describing the decentralized access control, we
need to discuss the Blockchain as data storage.
Figure 4: Overview of the Blockchain. Every block
contains a hash of the previous block. New transac-
tions are constantly added to the end of the chain,
source[4].
4.2 Data Model in Blockchain
A block chain is a transaction database shared by
all nodes participating in a system. As pointed out
earlier, Blockchain can be used as data storage for
many different applications; it provides various stor-
age functionalities, among those three primitives are
essential to our system: i. retrieve, ii. update,
and iii. add. Further, we explain how these pri-
mates are supported in the Blockchain and form the
data flow, but first we review some definitions in the
Blockchain adapted from Nakamoto paper [4] and
the Bitcoin Developer Guide [1], illustrated in Fig-
ure 4:
• Transaction: a transaction is a transfer of value
(e.g. Bitcoin, information) that is broadcast to the
network and collected into blocks. A transaction
references previous transaction outputs as new
transaction inputs and dedicates all input Bitcoin
values to new outputs. It is possible to browse and
view every transaction ever collected into a block.
• Block: transaction data is permanently recorded
in files called blocks. Blocks are organized into
a linear sequence over time (also known as the
block chain). As Figure 4 illustrates, every block
contains a hash of the previous block. New trans-
actions are constantly being processes by miners
into new blocks which are added to the end of the
chain and can never be changed or removed once
accepted by the network.
• Mining: is a distributed consensus system that is
used to confirm transactions and add transaction
records to the public ledger of past transactions
(Blockchain). It enforces a chronological order in
the Blockchain and allows different computers to
agree on the state of the system.
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• Miner: is an individual or an organization per-
forming the mining. Miners dedicate consid-
erable computation power for maintaining the
Blockchain. In Bitcoin miners are incentivized by
a reward i.e. Bitcoins. In our system miners are
researchers and organizations requesting and an-
alyzing the data; it is in their benefit to mine the
Blockchain.
• Blockchain: is a transaction database shared by
all nodes participating in a system. A full copy
of a Blockchain contains every transaction in or-
der, dating back to the very first one. The en-
tire Blockchain can be downloaded and openly re-
viewed by anyone.
• Genesis block: is the first block of a Blockchain.
The genesis block is hardcoded into the software
and is a special case in that it does not reference
a previous block.
Our system’s data flow is based on three essential
primitives enabled by the Blockchain:
1. Retrieve: per design, the entire Blockchain can
be retrieved and downloaded by anyone. With
this information, one can find out how much
value (e.g. Bitcoin, information) belonged to
each entity at any point in history.
2. Update: transactions and mining results are
broadcasted in the network, every new block is
ordered and linked to the previous block which
makes it impossible for nodes to miss any added
information.
3. Add: adding data is the same process as transfer-
ring data:
(a) When a node in a Blockchain wants to trans-
fer data, the node broadcasts the request,
the request is received by all the nodes on
the Blockchain network.
(b) After receiving the request, nodes which are
miners will add this most recent transaction
request into a block. Then they run the new
block and the previous block into a set of
hash function based calculations.
(c) All the miners start racing on the compli-
cated cryptographic puzzle. When the first
miner solved the block, it adds the block to
the end of Blockchain and will broadcast it
to its peers.
(d) After the broadcast, peers will check the
transaction and will start using the new ver-
sion of Blockchain.
Figure 5: Client Access Models to the BlockChain.
Left: Direct Access, Right: Server Client. Blue lines
indicate Blockchain access, red line indicates API
call.
In the next section, we discuss different mechanisms
to allow our clients to connect to the data store sys-
tem. We use the above primitives and implement
a publish-subscribe messaging servie which delivers
transactions to their intended recipients.
5 Messaging Service
In all the emerging big data analytic domains, in-
teraction with the data flow is a major issue and
it is crucial to adopt the most scalable solution. In
general, there are three different client data access
models available for users to access and communi-
cate with the data store system: i. direct access,
ii. server-client model, and iii. publish-subscribe
model.
In this section, we review these three options. We
explain how publish-subscribe architecture provides
scalable, flexible, and reliable communication be-
tween many senders and receivers without the need
of persistent connectivity. Furthermore, we explain
how we adapt the publish-subscribe model into our
solution. In our system, whenever two roles want to
interact, one sends a message to the messaging ser-
vice component. Then, the elements of messaging
service will send the message to the data store sys-
tem which is based on Blockchain. After successful
storage of the message in the Blockchain (data store
system), it will be fetched by the recipient through
the messaging service.
5.1 Data Access Model
In order to address a variety of use cases we present
three different client data access models for data
owners and other participants to interact with the
Data Flow.
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• Direct Access: Blockchain openness allows any-
one to download the whole distributed database
up to the present and subsequent updates as
deltas (blocks). (Figure 5-Left) This method is
very straightforward and requires minimal im-
plementation. It provides full validation of the
Blockchain, as well as maintaining the highest
level of safety and privacy. However, this model
is not feasible to implement in all environments.
This model requires a powerful, always-on com-
puter to handle a large amount of data and to
query this data. Devices such as mobile phones,
embedded systems or other less powerful sys-
tems typically lack the resources to interact di-
rectly with the data flow. In reality, each entity
whether it is Data Owner, Data Source, or Data
Requester, is interested only in a small fraction
of data. Excess amount of redundant processing,
as each client will need to process and download
the entire Blockchain, results in a high amount of
waste.
• Server-Client: In environments where there is a
high degree of trust between two entities a client-
server model avoids the redundant processing as-
sociated with the Direct Access Model. In a client-
server model the server handles all of the client’s
interactions with the data flow (Figure 5-Right).
In these environments the client’s public and pri-
vate keys are transmitted to the server which acts
on the client’s behalf. Typically the client’s inter-
action with the data flow will be completely ab-
stracted by an application that interprets commu-
nication received from the server. Some strengths
of this model include: it allows for password re-
sets or other ways for the server to validate the
client’s identity, in case the client loses its keys.
This model introduces risks into the system. Since
client’s keys are stored on the server, in a server-
client environment, if a server is compromised, a
client’s keys might also get stolen. Since these
servers typically store large number of keys, they
are often the target of attackers.
• Publish-Subscribe (Pub-Sub): This model repre-
sents a mixture of the previous two systems. In a
Pub-Sub system the Publisher or Server monitors
the data flow on behalf of the Subscriber (Figure
6). This substantially minimizes the processing
load placed on the data owner. Clients subscribe
to a set of queries. The publisher then filters out
incoming traffic based on these queries, and only
communicates matching queries to the subscriber.
In these systems, the publisher does not have ac-
cess to the data. It communicates the encrypted
Figure 6: Publish-Subscribe client access model to
the Blockchain. Blue lines indicate the Blockchain
access, red lines indicate API call, and black lines
indicate publish-subscribe data transfer.
information, via a subscription, to the subscriber
who is then able to decrypt the information with
their private key. The traffic will be decrypted and
processed on the client side. The only query re-
quired in the protocol is matching the destination
to an identity. This query can be implemented
very efficiently using Bloom filter and provided by
the pub-sub model.
Next, we explain how we adopt the publish-
subscribe model into our solution.
5.2 Publish-Subscribe Model
In this section, we explain how users’ clients utilize
the subscribers to receive specific updates from the
Blockchain. As explained in the previous section,
a Blockchain is a collection of blocks. Each block
contains a set of transactions such as ticket request
and data access, between different roles in the sys-
tem. By using a publish-subscribe model, publish-
ers join the Blockchain, collect and filter appropriate
transactions, and provide subscribers with their re-
quested transactions. This process includes the fol-
lowing mechanisms:
1. Join: after joining the Blockchain, each publisher
receives updates and will be able to access previ-
ous blocks in the Blockchain. Then, subscribers
subscribe to one or more publishers, request a
dedicated cache space to be initiated on the pub-
lisher, and provide them with a set of identities
(public keys). The set of identities determines
which transactions the subscriber is interested to
receive. The cache space is intended to store data
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so data can be served faster when the subscriber
requests it. It should be noted that publishers
are located on machines that have access to the
Blockchain updates, and also have stored copy of
the Blockchain for fast local access. Subscribers
are located on the client’s machine.
2. Receive updates: whenever a new subscriber is
added, it is typically specified from which past
block it would like to start receiving new blocks.
Because of this, publishers can ensure that they
are sending updates beginning with the correct
block. Ideally all subscribers will receive up-
dates from the same block, i.e. the last added
block. Hence, publishers use one reader to re-
trieve updates, and then relay them to all in-
terested subscribers. In the case of error condi-
tions, the publisher needs to restart sending up-
dates from the last acknowledged location. For
this, the publisher may need to read an older up-
date. If many subscribers are recovering simul-
taneously, a naive implementation, a publisher
would read from many positions in blocks simul-
taneously, which might cause high publisher I/O
load. Another approach is to have one recovery
thread from the oldest position working towards
the end.
3. Filter: after receiving the updates from the
Blockchain, publisher breaks down the blocks
into original transactions. Then, transactions are
filtered on the publisher side; the subscribers in-
form the publishers of what filters they need.
The Publisher only delivers updates that meet the
specifications of the supplied filters. While the
evaluation of filters does place some additional
processing overhead on the publisher, it helps
conserve both memory and network bandwidth.
This is especially the case when there are many
subscribers that require only a small subset of the
data.
Subscribers request filtering for a set of identities
that may be matched with either the sender or
recipient of a transaction. For example, a sub-
scriber may request that a publisher filters mes-
sages only set as broadcast to all members. Using
this structure we can easily implement a Bloom
filter, which works efficiently under these condi-
tions. If a transaction is matched, it will be kept
and stored in the cache corresponding to the sub-
scriber.
4. Deliver: reliability is an important requirement.
For example, one missed update could lead to
permanent corruption in a user’s portfolio. Sub-
scribers receive the update stream of blocks. Pub-
lishers periodically track the delivery of updates
by having subscribers acknowledging the deliv-
ery of updates. It is assumed that Subscribers are
stateless, i.e it is not required for them to keep
track of the state of deliveries. When a subscriber
asks for receiving its updates, publisher sends
all the transactions in the cache corresponding
to the subscriber and asks for the subscriber’s
acknowledgment. Upon receiving the acknowl-
edgment, publisher clears the cache. Otherwise,
publisher keeps trying upon receiving the ac-
knowledgment.
It should be noted that one client may deploy
many subscribers, and one subscriber could join
many unique publishers. Each publisher joins only
one Blockchain.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
To estimate the performance of Dusc, we conduct
a number of experiments to collect real perfor-
mance characteristics of our prototype implementa-
tion. Our experiments are performed in the follow-
ing settings:
• Server. we use a 2.2 GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2660 Machine with 128GB of Ram, with
Ubuntu 14.04 x64 OS. Codes on this platform are
developed using Python 2.7 and PyCrypto library
for cryptographic algorithms.
• Client. we use an iPhone 6 with iOS 9.2.1. Codes
on this platform are developed using Swift 2 and
XCode 7. Apple Security Framework and Heim-
dall library is used for cryptographic algorithms.
To minimize the error and increase the confidence
level, each experiment is repeated 100 times and
the median measured value is reported. Further,
we describe the performance of three components
of Dusc:
6.0.1 Data Management Protocol
Authorization costs. as mentioned earlier, due
to scalability challenges, it is not feasible for data
sources to maintain an ACL. Therefore, data sources
compute the authorization upon receipt of data re-
quests rather than performing a lookup. To eval-
uate the overhead of this operation, we execute a
batch of authorization checks on data requests with
variable number of capabilities. Each request could
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Figure 7: Authorization costs in the data manage-
ment protocol.
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Figure 8: Bloom filter performance in messaging
service Pub-sub.
contain multiple capabilities, the time spent to pro-
cess one capability is 3.53e− 2 s constant. Figure
7 shows the measured time for authorization check
of a data request with different number of capabil-
ities on the server with single core resource alloca-
tion. This metric performs linearly in respect to the
number of capabilities, but constant in respect to the
number of owners and data objects. For a request
with 1M capability, authorization takes 2.6 s.
Create and verify messages. data management
protocol contains five different class of messages.
For each message communicated, the sender creates
a message and the recipient verifies the integrity of
the message. We have evaluated these overheads for
three different roles: data source, data owner, and
data requester. We have also considered two scenar-
ios where each role is executed on either the server
or client side. As shown in Table 2, the overhead in
all the above scenarios is negligible.
6.0.2 Messaging Service
Pub-Sub performance. persistency of messages
and scalability of messaging service in Duscrelies on
the performance of the implemented Pub-Sub. For
our Pub-Sub implementation, we use Bloom filters
implementation of [6] to achieve near linear filter-
ing performance. Figure 8 shows time spent to filter
transactions in respect to the number of requested
keys. For each transaction in Dusc, there exists two
keys corresponding to sender and receiver. We use
RSA generated 1024-bit public key. On average, it
takes 1.12e−5 s to filter each transaction, when 1M
keys are presented under 0.1% Bloom filter error
rate. This time is almost negligible in respect to in-
creased number of keys.
7 Discussion
In this section we look back at the problems facing
scalable data access and how Duscaddresses the
aforementioned challenges.
The following challenges have been addressed
through the data management protocol:
1. User-centric. users are in full control of grant-
ing data access to their collective data. They can
always query the system and discover data that be-
longs to them.
2. Privacy-preserving. users preserve their pri-
vacy by consciously choosing who can access to
what data.
3. Endorsed. a well-defined role with well-
defined responsibilities.
12. Correct. we have shown the correctness in
Appendix I.
The following challenges have been addressed
through the messaging service and data store
system:
4. Accessible. every individual or organization
can easily join the Blockchain and Pub-Sub system.
5. Scalable. scalability performance have both
components have been discussed in Section 6.
6. De-centralized. there is no need for trusted
centralized point, Blockchain assures anyone can
play the role of ledger.
7. Distributed. data can be stored on various
data sources. Since our system separates actual
data store from data management, no data has to
be moved from its point of origin.
8. Asynchronous. both data and service are al-
ways available to clients with bad connectivity. Pub-
Sub ensures messages are cached by the Publishers
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Table 2: Overhead of create and verify messages in the data management protocol.
Step Role Quantity # Processing Cores Processing Overhead (second)
Message 1 (Create) Source N/A 1 1.20E−02
Message 1 (Verify) Owner N/A 1 2.00E−02
Message 2 (Verify) Owner 1 Endorser 1 1.66E−02
Message 2 (Verify) Owner 10 Endorsers 1 2.20E−01
Message 3 (Create) Owner 1 Capability 1 8.77E−03
Message 3 (Create) Owner 10 Capabilities 1 8.57E−02
Message 3 (Create) Owner 100 Capabilities 1 8.54E−01
Message 3 (Verify) Requester 1 Capability 1 2.37E−02
Message 3 (Verify) Requester 10 Capabilities 1 1.89E−01
Message 3 (Verify) Requester 100 Capabilities 1 1.84E+00
Message 4 (Create) Requester 1 Capability 1 1.59E−04
Message 4 (Create) Requester 10 Capabilities 1 3.98E−04
Message 4 (Create) Requester 100 Capabilities 1 2.79E−03
Message 4 (Verify) Source 1 Capability 1 3.51E−02
Message 4 (Verify) Source 10 Capabilities 1 3.28E−01
Message 4 (Verify) Source 100 Capabilities 1 3.26E+00
Message 4 (Verify) Source 100 Capabilities 16 2.00E−01
Message 4 (Verify) Source 1000 Capabilities 16 2.05E+00
Message 5 (Create) Source N/A 1 1.02E−02
Message 5 (Verify) Owner N/A 1 1.54E−02
and Blockchain assures the availability of data.
10. Transparent. this is a property of Blockchain.
11. Auditable. another property of Blockchain.
The following are general properties of our
system:
9. Compliant. our model provides a particular
advantage, because it does not store any data, or
user identifiable information, it may not be subject
to the regulatory requirements.
13. Usable. all the data owner functionalities are
exposed to a user through a mobile app, then can
simply view their data portfolio and grant access to
data requesters.
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Appendix I: Data Management Protocol
Analysis
Security correctness is a major requirement for
practical applications. In Dusc, this requirement
is assured thorough using delegation by certificate
method. In this section we provide a more formal
proof using Abadi et al’s notion and method intro-
duced in [2] and [3].
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The data management protocol relies on two
abilities:
D1. Ability of the Source (S) to give to another prin-
cipal Owner (O) the authority to act on Source’s
behalf
D2. Ability of the Owner (O) to give to another
principal Requester (R) the authority to act on
Owner’s behalf
In this section, these abilities are discussed as a
form of delegation (more throughly studied in [2]).
In our delegation model, when a data requester (R)
requests a data from a data source (S), R presents a
token demonstrating: R is making the request and
owner (O) has delegated to R. Upon Rs request,
an access will be granted, only if S decides this
delegation is permitted. This process is usually
done by looking up an ACL. However, in our system
S delegates the decision on the former delegation
to O through another delegation as a substitution
of an ACL record. In other word, O is delegated to
decide if delegation of O to R is permitted to access
a certain object. This positions O in the center of
access control.
In the proposed protocol these rights in each
delegation is as follows:
1. in D1 Source delegates the access control deci-
sion on a certain data object to Owner
2. in D2 Owner delegates the access to this data
object on source with a certain query to the re-
quester
In our system, delegation certificates are not
transferable, and access control decisions depends
only on the identities of both O and R.
Delegation relies on some form of trust among R,
O, and S preferably by authentication. In our sys-
tem:
1. Owner and source are assumed authenticated
(Assumption A1, A2)
2. Owner authenticates endorsers by using a
trusted third party and may trusts the requester
by endorsement (Assumption A3)
We consider three instances of delegation. In each
case we are led to ask whether composite princi-
pals, such as B—A, appear on Cs ACL. The simplest
instance of delegation is delegation without certifi-
cates:
1. When B wishes to make a request r on As behalf,
B sends the signed request along with As name,
for example in the format KB says A says r
2. When C receives the request r, he has evidence
that B has said that A requests r, but not that A
has delegated to B; then C consults the ACL for
request r and determines whether the request
should be granted under these circumstances
The following is the reasoning of the data source
(S), who makes the access control decision.
In the message 4, when R wishes to access the
data object (d) on the data owner (O)’s behalf,
the data requester (R) sends the data access ticket
(DAT ) received in step 3, signed with its public key
(KR) to the data source (S). It contains two delega-
tion certificates:
1. DOT which is the certificate of D1 deligation.
2. {Query,O,K3O,KR}K′O : which is the certificate of
D2 deligation.
The signed message of {Query,O,K3O,KR}K′O veri-
fies that R is deligated by O under R∧Query∧d ac-
cess right:
O says [R∧Query∧d])
At this point, S needs to decide if this deligation
have access to data object d. Using DOT, S verifies
that O is deligated to control d by S itself:
S says (O controls d)
Therefore access will be granted.
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